Jeffrey Ely

Jeff Ely is the Charles E. and Emma H. Morrison Professor of Economics at Northwestern University and an accomplished latte-artist. He is co-director of the Center for Economic Theory, a member of several editorial boards and co-author of the blog Cheap Talk.

Click here to blast this page, Asteroids style. Space bar fires, arrows move.

Follow @jeffely on twitter.

14

Feb 2015

Beeps

I study dynamic persuasion mechanisms.  A principal privately observes the evolution of a stochastic process and sends messages over time to an agent.  The agent takes actions in each period based on her beliefs about the state of the process and the principal wishes to influence the agent’s action.  I characterize the optimal persuasion mechanism

1

Jan 2015

Optimal Contracts for Loss-Averse Consumers

We study optimal contract design between a monopolist and a continuum of potential buyers under asymmetric information and reference-dependent preferences. In our model, the consumer’s total valuation for product quality is composed of the intrinsic consumption valuation, which is affected by privately known types, and an additional gain-loss valuation that depends on deviations of purchased

28

Aug 2013

Torture

We study torture as a mechanism for extracting information from a suspect who may or may not be informed. We show that the opti- mal use of torture is hindered by two commitment problems. First, the principal would benefit from a commitment to torture a victim he knows to be innocent. Second, the principal would

30

Jun 2013

Overbooking

We consider optimal pricing policies for airlines when passengers are uncertain at the time of ticketing of their eventual willingness to pay for air travel. Auctions at the time of departure efficiently allocate space and a profit maximizing airline can capitalize on these gains by overbooking flights and repurchasing excess tickets from those passengers whose

1

Apr 2013

Suspense and Surprise

We model demand for non-instrumental information, drawing on the idea that people derive entertainment utility from suspense and surprise. A period has more suspense if the variance of the next period’s beliefs is greater. A period has more surprise if the current belief is further from the last period’s belief. Under these definitions, we analyze

Jeffrey Ely

Jeff Ely is the Charles E. and Emma H. Morrison Professor of Economics at Northwestern University and an accomplished latte-artist. He is co-director of the Center for Economic Theory, a member of several editorial boards and co-author of the blog Cheap Talk.

Click here to blast this page, Asteroids style. Space bar fires, arrows move.

14

Feb 2015

Beeps

I study dynamic persuasion mechanisms.  A principal privately observes the evolution of a stochastic process and sends messages over time to an agent.  The agent takes actions in each period based on her beliefs about the state of the process and the principal wishes to influence the agent’s action.  I characterize the optimal persuasion mechanism

1

Jan 2015

Optimal Contracts for Loss-Averse Consumers

We study optimal contract design between a monopolist and a continuum of potential buyers under asymmetric information and reference-dependent preferences. In our model, the consumer’s total valuation for product quality is composed of the intrinsic consumption valuation, which is affected by privately known types, and an additional gain-loss valuation that depends on deviations of purchased

28

Aug 2013

Torture

We study torture as a mechanism for extracting information from a suspect who may or may not be informed. We show that the opti- mal use of torture is hindered by two commitment problems. First, the principal would benefit from a commitment to torture a victim he knows to be innocent. Second, the principal would

30

Jun 2013

Overbooking

We consider optimal pricing policies for airlines when passengers are uncertain at the time of ticketing of their eventual willingness to pay for air travel. Auctions at the time of departure efficiently allocate space and a profit maximizing airline can capitalize on these gains by overbooking flights and repurchasing excess tickets from those passengers whose

1

Apr 2013

Suspense and Surprise

We model demand for non-instrumental information, drawing on the idea that people derive entertainment utility from suspense and surprise. A period has more suspense if the variance of the next period’s beliefs is greater. A period has more surprise if the current belief is further from the last period’s belief. Under these definitions, we analyze