Jeffrey Ely

Jeff Ely is the Charles E. and Emma H. Morrison Professor of Economics at Northwestern University and an accomplished latte-artist. He is co-director of the Center for Economic Theory, a member of several editorial boards and co-author of the blog Cheap Talk.

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4

May

Adverse Selection and Unraveling in Common-

We investigate a common-value labor setting in which firms interview a worker prior to hiring. When firms have private information about the worker’s value and interview decisions are kept private, many firms may enter the market, interview, and hire with positive probability. When firms’ interview decisions are revealed, severe adverse selection arises. As a result, all firms except for the highest-ranked firm are
excluded from the hiring process. Sequential interviewing with revelation restores entry and improves upon the outcome with private interview decisions.torture in which the credibility of these threats and promises are endogenous. We show that these commitment problems dramatically reduce the value of torture and can even render it completely effective. We use our model to address questions such as the effect of enhanced interrogation techniques, rights against indefinite detention, and delegation of torture to specialists.

 

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Jeffrey Ely

Jeff Ely is the Charles E. and Emma H. Morrison Professor of Economics at Northwestern University and an accomplished latte-artist. He is co-director of the Center for Economic Theory, a member of several editorial boards and co-author of the blog Cheap Talk.

Click here to blast this page, Asteroids style. Space bar fires, arrows move.

4

May 2013

Adverse Selection and Unraveling in Common-

We investigate a common-value labor setting in which firms interview a worker prior to hiring. When firms have private information about the worker’s value and interview decisions are kept private, many firms may enter the market, interview, and hire with positive probability. When firms’ interview decisions are revealed, severe adverse selection arises. As a result, all firms except for the highest-ranked firm are
excluded from the hiring process. Sequential interviewing with revelation restores entry and improves upon the outcome with private interview decisions.torture in which the credibility of these threats and promises are endogenous. We show that these commitment problems dramatically reduce the value of torture and can even render it completely effective. We use our model to address questions such as the effect of enhanced interrogation techniques, rights against indefinite detention, and delegation of torture to specialists.

 

Tags: , , ,


Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

You may use these HTML tags and attributes: <a href="" title=""> <abbr title=""> <acronym title=""> <b> <blockquote cite=""> <cite> <code> <del datetime=""> <em> <i> <q cite=""> <strike> <strong>