Jeffrey Ely

Jeff Ely is the Charles E. and Emma H. Morrison Professor of Economics at Northwestern University and an accomplished latte-artist. He is co-director of the Center for Economic Theory, a member of several editorial boards and co-author of the blog Cheap Talk.

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Follow @jeffely on twitter.

4

May 2013

Adverse Selection and Unraveling in Common-

We investigate a common-value labor setting in which firms interview a worker prior to hiring. When firms have private information about the worker’s value and interview decisions are kept private, many firms may enter the market, interview, and hire with positive probability. When firms’ interview decisions are revealed, severe adverse selection arises. As a result,

29

Apr 2013

Adverse Selection and Unraveling in Common-Value Labor Markets

We investigate a common-value labor setting in which firms interview a worker prior to hiring. When firms have private information about the worker’s value and interview decisions are kept private, many firms may enter the market, interview, and hire with positive probability. When firms’ interview decisions are revealed, severe adverse selection arises. As a result,

29

Apr 2013

Torture

We study torture as a mechanism for extracting information from a suspect who may or may not be informed. We show that the optimal use of torture is hindered by two commitment problems. First, the principal would benefit from a commitment to torture a victim he knows to be innocent. Second, the principal would benefit

24

Jan 2013

Mechanism Design Without Revenue Equivalence

We characterize incentive compatible mechanisms in quasi-linear environments where the envelope theorem and revenue equivalence fail due to non-convex and non-differentiable valuations. Despite these obstacles, we obtain a characterization based on the familiar Mirrlees representation of the indirect utility and a monotonicity condition on the allocation rule. These conditions pin down the range of…

19

Jan 2010

Torture

We study torture as a mechanism for extracting information from a suspect who may or may not be informed. We show that the optimal use of torture is hindered by two commitment problems. First, the principal would benefit from a commitment to torture a victim he knows to be innocent. Second, the principal would benefit

Jeffrey Ely

Jeff Ely is the Charles E. and Emma H. Morrison Professor of Economics at Northwestern University and an accomplished latte-artist. He is co-director of the Center for Economic Theory, a member of several editorial boards and co-author of the blog Cheap Talk.

Click here to blast this page, Asteroids style. Space bar fires, arrows move.

4

May 2013

Adverse Selection and Unraveling in Common-

We investigate a common-value labor setting in which firms interview a worker prior to hiring. When firms have private information about the worker’s value and interview decisions are kept private, many firms may enter the market, interview, and hire with positive probability. When firms’ interview decisions are revealed, severe adverse selection arises. As a result,

29

Apr 2013

Adverse Selection and Unraveling in Common-Value Labor Markets

We investigate a common-value labor setting in which firms interview a worker prior to hiring. When firms have private information about the worker’s value and interview decisions are kept private, many firms may enter the market, interview, and hire with positive probability. When firms’ interview decisions are revealed, severe adverse selection arises. As a result,

29

Apr 2013

Torture

We study torture as a mechanism for extracting information from a suspect who may or may not be informed. We show that the optimal use of torture is hindered by two commitment problems. First, the principal would benefit from a commitment to torture a victim he knows to be innocent. Second, the principal would benefit

24

Jan 2013

Mechanism Design Without Revenue Equivalence

We characterize incentive compatible mechanisms in quasi-linear environments where the envelope theorem and revenue equivalence fail due to non-convex and non-differentiable valuations. Despite these obstacles, we obtain a characterization based on the familiar Mirrlees representation of the indirect utility and a monotonicity condition on the allocation rule. These conditions pin down the range of…

19

Jan 2010

Torture

We study torture as a mechanism for extracting information from a suspect who may or may not be informed. We show that the optimal use of torture is hindered by two commitment problems. First, the principal would benefit from a commitment to torture a victim he knows to be innocent. Second, the principal would benefit