Jeffrey Ely

Jeff Ely is the Charles E. and Emma H. Morrison Professor of Economics at Northwestern University and an accomplished latte-artist. He is co-director of the Center for Economic Theory, a member of several editorial boards and co-author of the blog Cheap Talk.

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14

Feb

Beeps

I study dynamic persuasion mechanisms.  A principal privately observes the evolution of a stochastic process and sends messages over time to an agent.  The agent takes actions in each period based on her beliefs about the state of the process and the principal wishes to influence the agent’s action.  I characterize the optimal persuasion mechanism and apply it to some examples.

In particular, this paper gives the answer to this question that I first posed in March of 2012.  Special thanks to Kevin Bryan and Toomas Hinnosaar for early discussions on this topic.

Here is a link to a new draft of the paper.  As of 2/12/15 it has a proof of the optimal mechanism in the bank run example.  As of 10/6/2014 it includes sections on strategic agents, multiple interacting agents, and a continuous-time analysis.

Here is a link to my presentation slides.


One thought on “Beeps

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Jeffrey Ely

Jeff Ely is the Charles E. and Emma H. Morrison Professor of Economics at Northwestern University and an accomplished latte-artist. He is co-director of the Center for Economic Theory, a member of several editorial boards and co-author of the blog Cheap Talk.

Click here to blast this page, Asteroids style. Space bar fires, arrows move.

14

Feb 2015

Beeps

I study dynamic persuasion mechanisms.  A principal privately observes the evolution of a stochastic process and sends messages over time to an agent.  The agent takes actions in each period based on her beliefs about the state of the process and the principal wishes to influence the agent’s action.  I characterize the optimal persuasion mechanism and apply it to some examples.

In particular, this paper gives the answer to this question that I first posed in March of 2012.  Special thanks to Kevin Bryan and Toomas Hinnosaar for early discussions on this topic.

Here is a link to a new draft of the paper.  As of 2/12/15 it has a proof of the optimal mechanism in the bank run example.  As of 10/6/2014 it includes sections on strategic agents, multiple interacting agents, and a continuous-time analysis.

Here is a link to my presentation slides.


One thought on “Beeps

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

You may use these HTML tags and attributes: <a href="" title=""> <abbr title=""> <acronym title=""> <b> <blockquote cite=""> <cite> <code> <del datetime=""> <em> <i> <q cite=""> <strike> <strong>