Jeff Ely Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Behavioral Economics, Evolution


Optimal Feedback in Contests Joint with George Georgiads,
Sina Khorasani and Luis Rayo

We derive optimal contests for environments where output takes the form of breakthroughs and the principal has an informational advan

Rotation as Contagion
Joint with Andrea Galeotti and Jakub Steiner

We study rotation schemes that govern individuals’ activities within an organization during an epidemic. We optimize the

Optimal Test Allocation Joint with Jakub Steiner and
Andrea Galeotti

A health authority chooses a binary action for each of several individuals that differ in their pre-test probabilities of being infected and in the

Sequential Information Design Joint with Laura Doval

We study games of incomplete information as both the information structure and the extensive form vary. An analyst may know the payoff-

A Cake-Cutting Solution to Gerrymandering

I propose a mechanism for redistricting inspired by cake-cutting mechanisms for fair division. The majority party proposes a partition of a state into

Moving the Goalposts Joint with Martin Szydlowski

We study information as an incentive device in a dynamic moral hazard frame- work. An agent works on a task of uncertain difficulty, modeled


I introduce and study dynamic persuasion mechanisms. A principal privately observes the evolution of a stochastic process and sends messages over time to an agent.

Torture Joint with Sandeep Baliga

We study torture as a mechanism for extracting information from a suspect who may or may not be informed. We show that a standad rationale

Critical Types Joint with Marcin Peski

How can we know in advance whether simplifying assumptions about beliefs will make a difference in the conclusions of