Kellogg Podcast on Sunk Costs
Sandeep Baliga
Research
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Screening With Tests
I study the monopolistic design of a college admissions test. Students have private information about their ability and apply to colleges by submitting verifiable resumes in addition to test results.
Incentive-Compatible Information Design Joint with Hershdeep Chopra
We study the design of mechanisms by an intermediary that generate information for a sender and for a receiver about an unknown attribute of the sender.
Interim Information Design Joint with Hershdeep Chopra
We study efficient and consumer-surplus maximizing information policies in a bilateral trade setting where the buyer is initially privately imperfectly privately informed about her willingness to pay.
Suspense and Surprise joint with Alex Frankel and Emir Kamenica
We model demand for noninstrumental information, drawing on the idea that people derive entertainment utility from
Natural Selection of Artificial Intelligence Joint with Balazs Szentes
We study the AI control problem in the context of decentralized eco- nomic production. Profit-maximizing firms employ artificial intelligence
Feedback Design in Dynamic Moral Hazard Joint with George Georgiadis and Luis Rayo
We study the joint design of dynamic incentives and performance feedback for an environment with a coarse (all-or-nothing) measure of
Ruth, Anthony, and Clarence
Non-partisan voters can become polarized not because of ideology but because it is optimal for them to remain uninformed and cancel out the votes of uninformed voters on “the other side.”
Sequential Information Design Joint with Laura Doval
We study games of incomplete information as both the information structure and the extensive form vary. An analyst may know the payoff-
Moving the Goalposts Joint with Martin Szydlowski
We study information as an incentive device in a dynamic moral hazard frame- work. An agent works on a task of uncertain difficulty, modeled
Natural Selection of Artificial Intelligence Joint with Balazs Szentes
We study the AI control problem in the context of decentralized eco- nomic production. Profit-maximizing firms employ artificial intelligence
Feedback Design in Dynamic Moral Hazard Joint with George Georgiadis and Luis Rayo
We study the joint design of dynamic incentives and performance feedback for an environment with a coarse (all-or-nothing) measure of
Ruth, Anthony, and Clarence
Non-partisan voters can become polarized not because of ideology but because it is optimal for them to remain uninformed and cancel out the votes of uninformed voters on “the other side.”
Optimal Feedback in Contests Joint with George Georgiads,
Sina Khorasani and Luis Rayo
We derive optimal contests for environments where output takes the form of breakthroughs and the principal has an informational advan
Optimal Test Allocation Joint with Jakub Steiner and
Andrea Galeotti
A health authority chooses a binary action for each of several individuals that differ in their pre-test probabilities of being infected and in the
Rotation as Contagion
Mitigation Joint with Andrea Galeotti and Jakub Steiner
We study rotation schemes that govern individuals’ activities within an organization during an epidemic. We optimize the
Beeps
I introduce and study dynamic persuasion mechanisms. A principal privately observes the evolution of a stochastic process and sends messages over time to an agent.
Torture Joint with Sandeep Baliga
We study torture as a mechanism for extracting information from a suspect who may or may not be informed. We show that a standad rationale
Critical Types Joint with Marcin Peski
How can we know in advance whether simplifying assumptions about beliefs will make a difference in the conclusions of
Sequential Information Design Joint with Laura Doval
We study games of incomplete information as both the information structure and the extensive form vary. An analyst may know the payoff-
A Cake-Cutting Solution to Gerrymandering
I propose a mechanism for redistricting inspired by cake-cutting mechanisms for fair division. The majority party proposes a partition of a state into
Moving the Goalposts Joint with Martin Szydlowski
We study information as an incentive device in a dynamic moral hazard frame- work. An agent works on a task of uncertain difficulty, modeled
